Research and Insights Archive

Research and Insights from the Center for Effective Organizations

Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design

Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics), and Mark E. Vargas (University of Texas) analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems

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National Differences in Performance-Dependent Compensation Practices: The United States vs. The Netherlands

This paper by E. Pieter Jansen (University of Groningen), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), and Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics) describes the findings of a study aimed at providing an international replication of a U.S.-based study by Gibbs et al. (2004, 2006) focused on the performance-dependent compensation practices of firms in the automobile retailing industry.

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Employment Horizon and the Choice of Performance Measures: Empirical Evidence from Annual Bonus Plans of Loss-Making Entities

Michal Matejka (University of Michigan), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), and Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics) examine the extent to which the presence of employment horizon issues affects the relative emphasis on financial versus nonfinancial performance measures in annual bonus plans.

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Performance Measure Properties and Incentives

Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics), and Mark E. Vargus (University of Texas) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of incentive design, focusing on effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and ma-nipulation).

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Performance Measure Choice and Target Setting in Loss-Making Firms

Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (USC), and Michal Matejka (University of Michigan) share that prior research has shown the absence of a significant link between financial performance measures and cash incentive payments in loss-making firms, but only conjectures have been offered to explain this finding.

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Performance Measure Choice and Target Setting in Loss-Making Firms

Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (USC), and Michal Matejka (University of Michigan) examine the choice of performance measures and performance target difficulty in CEO annual bonus plans in loss-making firms.

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Measuring the Impact of a Managerial Competency System: Does Identifying and Rewarding Potential Leaders Improve Organizational Performance?

Alec R. Levenson (CEO), Wim A. Van Der Stede (USC), and Susan Cohen (CEO) discuss how the use of competency systems to evaluate, reward, and promote managers has become commonplace in large organizations in recent years.

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Disciplinary Constraints on the Advancement of Knowledge: The Case of Organizational Incentive Systems

Kenneth A. Merchant, Wim A. Van Der Stede, and Liu Zheng argue that research progress in accounting has been significantly hindered by most researchers’ excessively narrow focus on a single research discipline.

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