Alec R. Levenson (CEO), Cindy Zoghi (BLS), Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), and George S. Benson (University of Texas) study effects of a firm’s attempt to optimize an existing incentive scheme to increase sales growth for direct store delivery workers.
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What is the Best Way to Design Your Employees’ Jobs?
Different jobs and businesses require professionals with different skills. Michael Gibbs, Clinical Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and Alec Levenson, Research Scientist at the USC, explain the advantages and disadvantages of two opposite, yet complementary, approaches used to design employee jobs.
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Why are Jobs Designed the Way They Are?
In this chapter Alec R. Levenson (CEO), Michael Gibbs, and Cindy Zoghi study job design. Do organizations plan precisely how the job is to be done ex ante, or ask workers to determine the process as they go?
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Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design
Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics), and Mark E. Vargas (University of Texas) analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems
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Performance Measure Properties and Incentives
Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), Kenneth A. Merchant (USC), Wim A. Van Der Stede (London School of Economics), and Mark E. Vargus (University of Texas) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of incentive design, focusing on effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and ma-nipulation).
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Why are Jobs Designed the Way they Are?
In this paper, Michael Gibbs (University of Chicago), Alec R. Levenson (CEO), and Cindy Zoghi (BLS) study job design. Do organizations plan precisely how the job is to be done ex ante, or ask workers to determine the process as they go?
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The Economic Approach to Personnel Research
M. Gibbs and A. Levenson explain that the economic approach to personnel and organizations has grown greatly in scope and importance over the last decade or two.
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